We investigate whether available enforcement mechanisms affects who shares risk with whom in sub-Saharan Africa by applying dyadic regression analysis to data from a lab-type experiment, surveys and a genealogical mapping exercise. During the experiment participants were invited to form risk sharing groups under three enforcement mechanisms: external, intrinsic, and extrinsic, i.e., social sanctioning.
Introduction
It is common for households to pool or share risk, for instance through mutual insurance arrangements (e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig 2001 , Fafchamps and Lund 2003 , De Weerdt and Fafchamps 2007 ) and group loans with joint liability (e.g. Besley and Coate 1995 , Ghatak 2000 , Ghatak 1999 , Morduch 1999 . The way in which risk sharing arrangements are enforced varies with the institutional and legal environment. Informal arrangements are thought to be enforced through a mix of quid pro quo, altruism, and adherence to social norms (e.g. Coate and Ravallion 1993 , Cox and Fafchamps 2007 , Platteau 1994 . Formal arrangements, such as insurance contracts and funeral societies, combine the above with external enforcement through courts and other adjudication processes (e.g. De Dercon 2006, De Weerdt, Dercon, Bold and Pankhurst 2006) . What remains unclear is whether and how the nature of the available enforcement mechanisms a¤ects who shares risk with whom. We investigate this issue using a laboratory-type experiment designed speci…cally for this purpose and conducted in the …eld.
Following the seminal work of Kimball (1988) and Coate and Ravallion (1993) , the theoretical literature has modelled informal risk sharing as a repeated game, in some cases, between self-interested parties (e.g. Kocherlakota 1996 , Ligon, Thomas and Worrall 2001 , Foster and Rosenzweig 2001 and, in others, between parties who are intrinsically motivated by feelings of altruism and anticipated guilt (e.g. Altonji, Hayashi and Kotliko¤ 1992 , Ravallion and Dearden 1988 , Cox 1987 , Cox, Eser and Jimenez 1998 , Cox and Fafchamps 2007 . This theoretical literature predicts that external enforcement overcomes the limitations imposed by dependency on intrinsic incentives and social enforcement. Consequently, it facilitates risk sharing between individuals who have little knowledge of one another and who neither trust nor care about one another's wellbeing. 1 1 Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2004) discuss the limitations imposed by self-enforcement on the formation of risk The primary purpose of this paper is to seek empirical support for predictions derived with reference to this literature using data from a controlled behavioral experiment conducted in rural Zimbabwe. The advantage of using an experimental approach is that it facilitates causal inference. This is because the possible e¤ect of who groups with whom on the enforcement mechanism that emerges is ruled out by design, leaving only the e¤ect of the latter on the former to be identi…ed. However, the approach requires that the participating subjects be placed in a somewhat arti…cial decision-making environment. This may cast doubt on whether the behavior observed during the experiment bears any resemblance to the corresponding behavior as it naturally arises (e.g. Bardsley 2005, Levitt and List 2007) . We aim to minimize this potential drawback in three ways. First, the experimental subjects are villagers who are known to engage in informal risk sharing. Second, each experimental session is conducted in a single village to ensure that the participants interact with people they already know. Third, the experiment is designed to allow face-to-face, rather than anonymous, interaction. A comparison of behavior within the experiment with real risk sharing within a sub-sample of villages indicates that these measures are at least partially successful (Barr and Genicot 2008) .
The experiment involves two rounds, played over two consecutive days. In the …rst round, participants independently play a version of Binswanger's gamble choice game (Binswanger 1980 ). In the second round, participants play the game a second time but are o¤ered, ex ante, the opportunity to form risk sharing groups. Within each group the proceeds of all members' gambles are shared equally. The institutional environment and, hence, the set of available enforcement mechanisms, is varied across three treatments applied during the second round.
In the …rst treatment, agreements to share winnings are externally enforced by the experimenter. In the second treatment, participants can secretly defect from an agreement after sharing networks.
observing the outcome of their own gamble. This implies that agreements are enforced only by intrinsic motivations (e.g., altruism and guilt). In the third treatment, participants can defect from an agreement after observing the outcome of their own gamble, but they have to publicly con…rm their defection to everyone in the session. This implies that extrinsic incentives in the form of social sanctions (e.g., shaming, threatened exclusion) can be brought to bear as additional incentives to deter defection.
Using the data generated by the experiment, Barr and Genicot (2008) show that individuals are most likely to enter into risk sharing agreements when those agreements are externally enforced, although even then many potentially bene…cial agreements are not entered into. 2 They also show that it is only under external enforcement that group formers engage in more risk taking. Further, in disagreement with the theoretical literature cited above, they …nd that individuals are least likely to enter into risk sharing arrangements in the third treatment. They go on to show that this third …nding is consistent with two possible theoretical explanations: either social sanctions in the form of full or partial exclusion, are costly to in ‡ict; or individuals su¤er from time-inconsistent preferences. However, they do not test either of these theories.
In contrast to Barr and Genicot (2008) , the focus of this paper is on who commits to share risk with whom under each of the three treatments. We investigate this by combining the experimental data with information from two surveys and a genealogical mapping exercise conducted on the same households. These additional sources of information provide a rich description of the economic and social contexts of the experimental participants, including data on the kinship and marriage ties they share, and the various churches and community based organizations (CBOs) to which they belong. To our knowledge, this is the …rst time that experimental data 2 Barr and Genicot's probit model for the individual decision to join a group in the experiment shows that the institutional (treatment) and regional environment (research area) are important predictors of group formation. The sex and education level of the participant also have marginal e¤ects, while other individual characteristics such as age, being a household head and being married do not a¤ect group formation. on group formation has been so richly complemented by pre-collected survey and genealogical information.
Our …ndings can be summarized as follows. In general, a pair of individuals is more likely to share risk the more similar they are in terms of age and gender. Belonging to the same religious group and being related by marriage support enforcement through social sanctioning possibly because each is associated with behavioral rules that are traditionally enforced through status manipulation, shame and guilt. In contrast, while co-members in economic CBOs are highly likely to group together when risk sharing relations are enforced either externally or by intrinsic incentives, they tend not to group together when social sanctions can be brought into play. This is consistent with social sanctions being costly to both sanctioners and sanctionees when applied within the context of these relationships because it would undermine the functioning of the organizations to which both belong.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 by presenting the experimental design. In section 3, we draw on existing theory to develop a set of predictions about who groups with whom in various contract enforcement environments. In section 4, we describe our testing strategy. Data sources and variable construction are discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, we present summary statistics relating to the experiment and, in Section 7 we present the empirical results. Section 8 concludes.
Experimental design
The experiment is based on a simple gamble choice game played with villagers in 14 di¤erent villages. In every village, each household is invited to send one adult, preferably the household head or his/her spouse, to participate in the games played in their village. Each participant plays the game twice, once on the …rst day and a second time the next day. Each round takes between one and two hours.
In each round, each participant is interviewed privately and asked to select one of six possible gambles g, ranked from the least (1) to the most risky (6). The gamble choice set is the same for all participants. Riskier gambles have higher expected returns. A similar game structure was originally used by Binswanger (1980) to elicit risk preferences; the choice of gamble implies a range of possible values for the individual's coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The gambles used in our experiment are presented in Table 1 together with the implied ranges of the risk aversion coe¢ cient. 3 On the …rst day, each participant plays the game individually and winnings are distributed at the end of play. At the end of the …rst day's round, participants are told to come back the next day to play the game a second time. They are informed that the next day, before choosing their gambles, they can if they wish form groups with other participants and that those in a group will share second day winnings equally. There are no restrictions on the size or composition of groups. Before going home, participants attend a training session during which they are shown how forming a group to pool winnings reduces risk, and how and to what extent the grouping arrangements will be enforced.
On the second day, participants are …rst asked to declare whether they have formed a group and with whom. Participants in a group have to register together and their intent to form a group is recorded by the enumerators. After all groups have been declared and agreed on, each participant then proceeds to select one of the six gambles individually and privately. At the end of play, winnings are calculated, pooled and shared equally for those in groups, and privately distributed to all participants.
The verbal framing of the game is kept to a minimum and, as a consequence, the game can be likened to a variety of real life situations, including risk sharing, which has been extensively studied in village communities (e.g. Udry 1994 , Ligon et al. 2001 , Fafchamps and Lund 2003 , and group lending with joint liability (e.g. Karlan 2007 , Besley and Coate 1995 , Ghatak 1999 , Ghatak 2000 . 4 To facilitate an analysis of the e¤ect of di¤erent enforcement mechanisms on who groups, with whom to share risk, three treatments are applied during the experiment. Under treatment 1, sharing is enforced by the experimenter: once participants have declared a group, they cannot subsequently change their mind, i.e., they cannot refuse to share their second day winnings with others in their group. So, regardless of the outcomes of all their gambles, their winnings are pooled and shared equally. Under treatment 2, after having selected a gamble and observed their individual winnings (but not those of others in their group), participants are o¤ered a chance to defect from their group, i.e., they can decide to keep their individual winnings. If they opt to do so, they do not receive a share of the winnings of others in their group. Treatment 3 is similar to treatment 2 except that participants who elect to keep their individual winnings have to con…rm their decision publicly in front of everyone participating in the same experimental session. Under each treatment, the consequences of -and rules relating to -group formation and defection are explained to participants during the training session on day one. 5 The treatments facilitate an analysis of the e¤ect of di¤erent forms of enforcement on who shares risk with whom in the following way. In treatment 1, the risk sharing arrangements are perfectly and exogenously enforced by the experimenter. In treatment 3, defection is public and can therefore trigger social punishment after the game is completed. Enforcement is extrinsic in the sense that it relates to the importance that individuals place on their repeated economic and social interactions within the village and whether and how they think these interactions might be damaged should they defect publicly during the experiment. In contrast, in treatment 2 defection is private and the identity of a defector is either impossible or di¢ cult to detect. 6 In this treatment, enforcement is thus primarily, if not exclusively, based on intrinsic incentives: altruism, reciprocity, and a desire to avoid feelings of guilt.
Each of the 14 villages studied here was randomly assigned to one of the three treatments.
All the participants in a single village receive the same treatment. Because the total number of villages is small, possible imbalances may arise between villages. We describe how we deal with this in the testing strategy section below.
Theory and predictions
Our objective is to identify the e¤ects of imperfect enforcement on who shares risk with whom. This is an empirical contribution, so we do not present a fully speci…ed theoretical model of group formation for risk sharing. Instead, we combine insights drawn from the already rich and diverse theoretical literature on this topic with ethnographic information pertaining to the villages in our study to generate a series of testable predictions.
Given the symmetry of the game and the nature of the gamble choice task, it is useful to …rst consider what groups would be formed among identically risk averse agents. Under perfect exogenous enforcement, i.e., enforcement by the experimenter, individuals should group as long as the mutual insurance bene…t exceeds the costs of forming a group. Let (s) denote the 6 Given that participants had only a small number of gambles to choose from, under treatment 2, they may have been able to draw limited inferences about whether others defected from the amount of money that is distributed to them at the end of day two. However, as noted by Barr and Genicot (2008) , inference is impossible in groups of size 2 because the other player can always claim to have selected the same gamble and gotten the same outcome. In groups of 3 or more, it is theoretically possible to infer that someone has defected, but impossible to tell who. bene…t derived from joining a group of size s and let the cost of joining the group be c. Cost c represents the time and e¤ort required, during the 24 hour interval between the two rounds of the experiment, to agree with others to share winnings. In general, (s) increases with s but at a decreasing rate. 7 It follows that if c > 0 there is an upper limit s on group size determined by 0 (s ) = c. If c = 0, it is optimal for all participants to join a single, village-wide group.
Di¤erences between participants in risk attitudes may a¤ect group formation. Assortative matching by risk attitudes has been discussed in detail by Legros and Newman (2007) in the context of marriage markets with non-transferable utility. They show that, if the form of risk sharing is unrestricted, risk averse and risk neutral individuals should team up so that the latter can insure the former. However, this is precluded in our experiment because we impose equal sharing of winnings within groups. With equal sharing exogenously imposed, Newman and Legros'model predicts positive assortative grouping by risk attitudes. 8 Newman and Legros do not explore the impact of risk attitudes on the likelihood of an individual choosing to marry. However, in our experiment where groups may be of any size and are more transient in nature, this could be important. If we assume that c is constant across individuals, more risk averse individuals should be more likely to group as it is they who bene…t most from mutual insurance. For risk neutral individuals, the gain from grouping is zero, and thus does not exceed the cost of forming a group as long as c > 0. Combined, these two observations about how risk attitudes a¤ect group formation imply that, unless c = 0, 7 This is most easily shown if we ignore gamble choices. Let yi be individual i's winnings and let average winnings in a group of size s be ys = multiple risk sharing groups will be observed in each village, participants will sort into groups with reference to their risk attitudes, and less risk averse individuals may not group. So, our …rst prediction concerning who shares risk with whom is as follows:
Prediction 1: Participants who are more similar with respect to their risk attitudes are more likely to group together to share risk during the experiment.
In practice, group formation costs c are likely to vary across pairs of individuals. Some pairs will be more socially proximate, i.e., they will be used to interacting with one another because they are related by blood or marriage, or belong to the same religious congregation or CBOs.
These pairs will have lower group formation costs and, other things being equal, will be more likely to group. Pairs who are similar with respect to gender, age, education, role within the household, and possibly income and wealth may also face lower group formation costs as they will …nd it easier to communicate and negotiate with one another. So, our second and third predictions concerning who shares risk with whom are as follows:
Prediction 2: Participants who are more similar in terms of gender, age, education, and so on are more likely to group together to share risk during the experiment.
Prediction 3: Participants who are socially proximate because they are kin, or belong to the same religion, or are co-members in CBOs are more likely to group together to share risk during the experiment.
So far we have assumed that risk sharing is perfectly enforced. Now we turn to the likely e¤ects of imperfect enforcement on who shares risk with whom and, hence, to the predictions that are of principal interest.
In the absence of any enforcement, the best response for a sel…sh individual is to cheat, i.e., join a group, take a high risk gamble, share winnings if a low payo¤ is realized, and defect otherwise. If all participants are sel…sh and aware of this, no-one will form a group. We therefore expect groups to be formed only between individuals who face su¢ cient incentives, intrinsic or extrinsic, not to cheat. This leads to the prediction that there will be less group formation under imperfect enforcement, i.e., under treatments 2 and 3 compared to treatment 1. Barr and Genicot (2008) presented evidence in support of this prediction.
Treatment 2 relies primarily, if not exclusively, on intrinsic incentives. Given this, we expect participants under treatment 2 to form groups only with those who they trust, possibly because they believe that they feel more altruistic towards them, and towards whom they feel more altruistic. Hamilton (1964) hypothesized that individuals, human or otherwise, exhibit more altruistim towards close kin and for non-human species there is now a considerable body of evidence supporting Hamilton's prediction (Brembs 2001) . Individuals may also be more inclined to trust those with whom they share religious beliefs and interact frequently via communitybased organizations. Social proximity in the form of kinship, co-religion, and co-memberships in CBOs matter under treatment 1 because they reduce group formation costs. If, in addition, they form a basis for altruism and trust, they should be more strongly associated with group formation under treatment 2 compared to treatment 1. So, our fourth prediction concerning who shares risk with whom is as follows:
Prediction 4: Social proximity in the form of kinship, co-religion and co-memberships in CBOs will be more strongly associated with risk sharing under Treatment 2, i.e., when enforcement depends on intrinsic incentives, compared to Treatment 1.
In treatment 3, additional extrinsic incentives are brought into play. Models of repeated interaction between self-interested agents, e.g., Coate and Ravallion (1993) , have shown that agreements can be enforced by the threat of exclusion from future interactions. Although in our experiment the risk pooling game is not repeated, under treatment 3 participants have to defect publicly and this may adversely a¤ect the ongoing relationships they have with other villagers.
Put another way, the public nature of the defections e¤ectively transforms the group formation in the game into an element in the series of repeated interactions in which the villagers are naturally engaged. This introduces an additional deterrent against defecting which, all other things being equal, should make group formation more attractive under treatment 3 compared to treatment 2. This is especially true among pairs of individuals who are engaged in ongoing series of repeated interactions such as co-members in religious congregations and CBOs, and even more especially where those interactions are voluntary and, thus, severable.
However, Barr and Genicot (2008) found less group formation under treatment 3 than under treatment 2 and concluded that all other things must not be equal. They went on to show theoretically how, under treatment 3, less group formation may arise from a fear of jeopardizing ongoing valuable relationships -either by giving way to the temptation to defect on the spur of the moment (due to inconsistent time preferences) or because other group members give way to such a temptation. By extrapolation, when pairs of individuals are heterogeneous, the likely cost associated with jeopardizing an ongoing series of interactions will be greater for pairs who are engaged in more valuable and more voluntary ongoing series of interactions.
The villagers involved in this study are used to forming CBOs to solve problems associated with missing markets and public good provision. Hence, these organizations and the relationships associated with co-membership in these organizations are likely to be of considerable value to the villagers. That said, membership in these organizations is voluntary and cases of expulsion and fractionalization are not unheard of. Thus, we assume that co-memberships in CBOs are both highly valued and vulnerable to disruption under treatment 3, should co-members choose to group. Religion is di¤erent because membership is primarily an individual decision and exclusion is more di¢ cult. Members of the same church may be (or become) friends but even if they are (or do) not they tend to tolerate one another. Kinship is potentially valuable but it is not, within the context of our experiment, voluntary. 9 Ties between in-laws are particularly interesting in the Zimbabwean context as they are associated with many reciprocal obligations and, no matter how displeased one is with one's in-laws, these reciprocal obligations remain and the repeated interaction continues. Based on this reasoning, our …fth and sixth predictions concerning who shares risk with whom are as follows:
Prediction 5: Social proximity in the form of kinship and co-religion will be more strongly associated with risk sharing under Treatment 3, i.e., when social sanctions can be brought to bear on participants who publicly default, compared to Treatment 1.
Prediction 6: However, co-members in CBOs will withdraw from group formation under treatment 3 (compared to Treatments 1 and 2).
Other factors may also come into play. One possibility is competition: participants may maximize a function that not only increases in their own monetary payo¤, as we have assumed until now, but also decreases in the monetary payo¤s of others in the village. If this is the case, group formation may be perceived as a way of reducing competition and the potential disruption that unequal winnings might cause. Alternatively, participants might want to join forces in order to 'outsmart' the experimenter. In this case, if participants see winning as an indication of gamesmanship, assortative matching on risk aversion may not take place, but we may observe matching on 'luck'in the …rst round of the game. To the extent possible, we control for these other factors when testing predictions 1 to 6.
Testing strategy
We do not have detailed information about the negotiations that took place between the participants during the group formation process and, this being the case, we are restricted to a reduced-form analysis. The other constraint placed upon us by our data relates to sample size;
for example, we have too few observations to e¤ectively explore non-linearities in the data.
Bearing these constraints in mind, we adopt the approach to group formation analysis proposed by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) and Arcand and Fafchamps (2008) . This approach uses network notation to represent groups and relies on the estimation of dyadic regression models of the general form:
where m ij = 1 if i is in a risk sharing group with individual j, and 0 otherwise; and (:) denotes the logit function. E[m ij ] increases with factors that make i (or j) more likely to group. Since by experimental design participants can only belong to one group, E[m ij ] also increases in the size of the group to which i (or j) belongs. Finally, E[m ij ] increases in factors that make i more likely to group with j, such as similarity or co-membership in CBOs.
The m ij 's are not independent of each other and, this being the case, one may be tempted to base the estimation on a joint maximum likelihood function. However, there are several problems with this approach. First, the estimation would require solving a complicated optimization problem with multiple integrals. This could, in principle, be achieved using the Gibbs algorithm, but at a non-negligible cost in terms of programming. Second and more importantly, writing down the joint likelihood function would force the researcher to specify the functional form of the interactions between observations. Theoretically, this could improve e¢ ciency, but it could also result in inconsistent estimates if the speci…ed form of the interaction were wrong. So, we opt for a simpler and more transparent approach whereby we regress m ij on a vector of ij-speci…c regressors applying a logit and correct for interdependence across observations using the method suggested by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) for dyadic regressions. Train (2003) recommends a similar logit approach to model multiple choice decisions (in our case, whom i groups with)
whenever each choice depends in the same way on choice-speci…c regressors.
As noted by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) , the estimation of dyadic models requires some care regarding the way regressors are incorporated. Taking all these factors into account, we estimate a model of the following form:
where: d ij is a vector of the characteristics of the relationship between individuals i and j, i.e., kinship and co-membership in religions and CBOs; t ij is a vector of treatment dummies; z i is a vector of the relevant characteristics of individual i including his or her gender, age, education, income, wealth, and as a proxy for their risk attitudes, their gamble choice g 1 i = f1; :::6g in round 1; and the 's are parameters to be estimated.
Before we proceed any further, note that our ability to indentify the predicted e¤ects by estimating model (1) depends on the experiment not being embedded within an ongoing, 1 0 When, in addition, each node i has the same number of links (which is not the case here), it is not possible to identify factors that make it more likely for i to have more links. This renders the regressors of the form (xi + xj) redundant.
community-wide risk sharing arrangement in every village. If the experiment is perfectly embedded within a community-wide risk sharing equilibrium with perfect truth-telling, participants could agree to pool risk outside the experiment. Thus, any treatment feature could be undone and should, as a consequence, not be expected to impact systematically on observed behavior within the experiment. If this were the case, 1 and 3 would be statistically indistinguishable from zero. Furthermore, if group formation costs within the experiment were positive, however small, we would observe no group formation and, hence, all the coe¢ cients in (1) would be statistically indistinguishable from zero. Provided this is not the case, we can rule out perfect embeddedness, in which case experimental features do matter and can be used to draw inference about underlying behavioral determinants.
We use model (1) to test the predictions presented in the previous section. Signi…cant elements in 1 , identify the impact of the treatments on the likelihood of an individual joining a group. Since treatment 1 is the omitted category, a negative coe¢ cient on treatment 2 and a larger negative coe¢ cient on treatment 3 would be consistent with the …ndings of Barr and Genicot (2008) .
The sign and signi…cance of coe¢ cients 2 ; 3 ; and 4 provide information regarding the e¤ects of group formation costs and intrinsic and extrinsic motivations on who groups with whom. A signi…cantly positive 2 supports Prediction 3 as it provides evidence that group formation costs are important and decline with social proximity d ij . A signi…cantly negative 4 corresponding to characteristic z supports Prediction 2 as it provides evidence that i's and j's who are more similar in terms of z are more likely to join the same group. Further, if the element in 4 that corresponds to the dyadic di¤erence in risk attitudes, jg 1 i g 1 j j, is signi…cant and negative it supports Prediction 1 as it provides evidence that i's and j's who are more similar in terms of their risk attitudes are more likely to group together. Signi…cant positive coe¢ cients on the interaction between treatment 3 and kinship and treatment 3 and co-religion provide support for Prediction 5. A signi…cant negative 3 indicates that individuals are choosing to protect the social ties and repeated interactions associated with a speci…c type of social proximity from the consequences of someone defecting in public during the experiment. A signi…cant negative coe¢ cient on the interaction between treatment 3 and co-memberships in CBOs provides support for Prediction 6.
Finally, signi…cant elements in 5 identify characteristics associated with joining larger groups or with joining a group rather than staying a singleton. 12 The term 5 (z i + z j ) are included primarily as controls. However, it is useful to note that a signi…cantly negative coef…cient on g 1 i + g 1 j provides evidence that less risk averse individuals are less likely to join risk sharing groups.
Winnings w i from round 1 are also included in z. If participants see winning as an indication of acumen or luck and if these attributes are universally valued, this could lead to assorting on …rst round winnings and a negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient on jw i w j j. If participants who were lucky in the …rst round think they do not need insurance in the second round and, so, choose not to group, we would observe a negative coe¢ cient on (w i + w j ). 13 1 1 Under treatment 3, reputational considerations in general should raise 2 , the coe¢ cient on the treatment dummy, but should not generate any signi…cant interaction term.
1 2 To see why, suppose that individuals with a large value of z form larger groups. This implies that E[mij] is an increasing function of zi + zj -and hence that 5 is positive. 1 3 A negative coe¢ cient on (wi + wj) could also potentially result from a wealth or income e¤ect.
Model (1) is estimated using a logit. As emphasized earlier, it is essential to correct standard errors for non-independence across observations. Non-independence arises principally because residuals from dyadic observations involving the same individual i are correlated, negatively or positively, with each other. Standard errors can be corrected for this type of non-independence by clustering either by dyad, as proposed by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) , or by village. The second approach corrects for possible non-independence not only within dyadic pairs sharing a common i or j but also across all the dyads participating in the same experimental session.
However, the estimates of the standard errors that it returns are consistent only when the number of clusters is large. 14 We have data from only 14 villages and, for this reason, we cluster by dyad rather than village.
As treatments are randomly assigned to villages, it should not be necessary to control for village characteristics. However, because the number of villages is small, unbalancedness across villages is a concern (see Table A1 in the appendix). To correct for this, village …xed e¤ects are included in some speci…cations.
The data
The experiments were conducted in 2001 in 23 Zimbabwean villages. However, in this paper we use the data from only 14. Of the remaining 9, three were assigned to a control treatment in which no group formation was allowed and 6 were not fully enumerated during the various surveys upon which we draw. The control treatment villages contain no information about group formation and are thus dropped from the analysis presented here. The six villages that were not fully enumerated have incomplete information regarding household income, wealth, kinship, religion and memberships in CBOs. When we cross the data to generate dyadic observations, incompleteness leads to a massive loss in usable observations, raising the possibility of selection bias. For this reason we prefer to omit these villages from our analysis. Since villages were randomly assigned to treatments, this should not a¤ect the validity of our inference.
Of the 14 villages in our sample, 10 were established in the early 1980s as part of a land redistribution programme. These resettled villages are relatively small and geographically concentrated. owing to the randomness of the settler selection process, inhabitants of these villages are less likely to be genetically related than members of non-resettled villages. However, in the large majority of cases they have lived in the same village for more than a decade, they engage in more associational activity and share more marriage ties (Barr 2004 , Dekker 2004 ).
Data on each participant's characteristics, such as age, gender, years of education and their position within the household, were collected at the time of the experiment. These data are complemented by survey data relating to the participants'households. The household surveys were conducted prior to the experiments, so any variables generated using the survey data cannot be in ‡uenced by the outcomes of the experiment.
As measures of household income and wealth, we use the variables constructed by Trudy
Owens and Hans Hoogeveen on the basis of the 1999 round of the Zimbabwe Rural Household Dynamics Study (ZRHDS) collected by Bill Kinsey. Wealth is measured in terms of livestock. Kinsey, Burger and Gunning (1998), Gunning, Hoddinott, Kinsey and Owens (2000) , and Hoogeveen and Kinsey (2001) discuss this dataset in detail.
The data on memberships in various religious groups and community-based organizations (CBOs) are drawn from a survey by Barr in 2000 (see Barr (2004) for details). In the case of the latter, we focus on co-memberships in CBOs with an explicit economic purpose, e.g., micro-…nance, mutual insurance, funeral societies, irrigation and livestock rearing cooperatives as it is these that are both valuable and voluntary.
Our data on family and marriage ties are derived from a speci…cally designed social mapping exercise conducted in 1999 and 2001 by village focus groups involving at least one representative from each household residing in each village (Dekker 2004 ). In the analysis, genetic relatedness is captured by a dummy variable taking the value 1 for relatives and zero otherwise. Relatedness by marriage is captured by a second dummy variable taking the value 1 for dyads related by marriage but not genetically and zero otherwise. The majority of participants belong to a religious community, most often one of the many apostolic religions existing in Zimbabwe. On average, participants belong to between three and four economic CBOs.
Descriptive statistics
Also reported in Table 2 Barr and Genicot (2008) , the propensity to group is lowest under treatment 3 when extrinsic incentives are allowed to come into play.
Several other individual-level descriptive statistics relating to the experiment are worth mentioning even though they are not apposite to our predictions. First, 48 and 46 percent of the participants won the higher payo¤ from their gambles in rounds 1 and 2 respectively and winning the higher payo¤ was not correlated across the rounds. These statistics indicate that the gambles were fair and independent. 17 Second, few participants reneged during the experiment:
under treatment 2, 37 participants joined groups, 15 of those went on to win high payo¤s and, thus, may have been tempted to defect, but only 3 did so; under treatment 3, 45 participants joined groups, 24 of these went on to win high payo¤s, but only one defected. With so few defections, it is impossible to investigate their determinants. However, the descriptives suggest that participants were quite adept at identifying trustworthy partners and tended not to be tempted to defect, especially in public. 18 Table 3 presents the characteristics of all the possible pairs or dyads of participants that can be made out of the 382 individual participants. By "possible pairs or dyads' we mean dyads that could have chosen to join the same risk sharing group within the experiment. These are all within-village dyads as, by design, between-village dyads could not group together.
Only 7% of all possible dyads joined the same risk sharing group. Even under treatment 1 where there was perfect exogenous enforcement, only 12% of the dyads joined the same group. 19 Straight away this suggests that either the equal sharing rule deterred participants with dissimilar risk preferences from grouping together or group formation costs and enforcement issues a¤ected grouping decisions.
Only 20% of the dyads belong to the same religious group. This re ‡ects the diversity of faiths present in each of the villages. The average dyad has approximately one co-membership in an economic CBO, although the maximum number of co-memberships in economic CBOs is 9. Owing to the prevalence of resettled villages in our sample and the fact that each household could send only one participant to the experiments, only 2 percent of the dyads in our sample are genetically related. Relatedness by marriage is more commonplace: 19 percent of the dyads are related by marriage. Dekker (2004) proposes and …nds support for the notion that, in the resettled villages, marriage has been used to create social ties between households. 20
Since the gamble choice variable g 1 i takes values from 1 to 6, the maximum di¤erence in gamble choice is 5 and the maximum sum is 12. The average absolute di¤erence in gamble choices is 1.23. The average di¤erence in round 1 winnings within dyads is 116 Zimbabwean dollars and the average sum of round 1 winnings is 324 Zimbabwean dollars.
Econometric analysis
Coe¢ cient estimates and corresponding standard errors for model (1) are presented in Table   4 . All standard errors and corresponding indicators of signi…cance are corrected for dyadic 1 9 Treatment 2 is under-represented in the dyadic sample because villages had to be dropped owing to incomplete data.
2 0 We have no information on geographical proximity. However, the study villages are small and geographically concentrated, i.e., not interspersed with …elds. The majority of participants have lived in the same village for one or two decades: Gans (1968) and Michaelson (1976) both …nd that the importance of geographical proximity as a determinant of tie formation declines over time.
clustering. The logit model in the …rst column includes two treatment dummies (treatment 1 is the basis for comparison) and the four social tie variables described above but no interaction terms. This model identi…es the raw treatment e¤ects 1 t ij . The logit model in the second column also includes the interaction terms 3 (t ij d ij ) and provides the …rst set of test results relating to our six predictions. The signi…cance of the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms included in the regressions tell us whether the e¤ects on grouping of each social tie in treatments 2 and 3 di¤er from its e¤ect in treatment 1. To establish whether each social tie has a signi…cant e¤ect on grouping in either treatment 2 or treatment 3, we have to test whether the sum of the coe¢ cient on the appropriate interaction term and the coe¢ cient on the social tie in treatment 1 is signi…cant. This is what the linear restriction tests at reported at the bottom of the table do. In the third column the uninteracted treatment dummies are replaced by a full set of village dummies. This model provides a second set of test results. Once again, linear restriction test results are also reported.
Before turning to the results pertaining to our six predictions, note that one of the treatment dummies is statistically signi…cant in columns 1 and 2. This rules out perfect embeddedness of the experiment within an ongoing community-wide risk sharing arrangement. 21 Once again, in accordance with Barr and Genicot (2008) , there is signi…cantly less group formation under treatment 3, when social sanctioning is possible. Treatment 2 is intermediate in terms of its impact on group formation but, in the presence of all the controls, it is statistically indistinguishable from treatment 1.
Results
Prediction 1: The di¤erence in round 1 gamble choices, jg 1 i g 1 j j, is never signi…cant. So, Prediction 1 is not supported: group formation in the experiment is not assortative with respect to risk attitudes. 22 The sum of round 1 gamble choices, g 1 i + g 1 j , is also never signi…cant. This indicates that risk averse individuals are no more likely to join sharing groups or to form larger groups. 23 The coe¢ cient on the sum of round 1 winnings, w i + w j , is negative and signi…cant in column 1 suggesting that participants who won more in round 1 are less likely to group in round 2. However, this result is not robust to the inclusion of the village …xed e¤ects.
These results are consistent with earlier …ndings based on survey data. For instance, Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) and De Weerdt and Fafchamps (2007) both …nd that risk sharing relationships are no more likely between individuals with di¤erent risk pro…les or abilities to bear risk.
Prediction 2: All three models in Table 4 provide strong evidence of assortative grouping with respect to gender, i.e., the coe¢ cient on the dyadic di¤erences in gender is negative and highly signi…cant. This is consistent with Prediction 2 which states that participants are more likely to group with others who are similar to themselves. This may be because, for them, group formation is less costly. 24
Prediction 3: The model in column 1 indicates that, on average across all treatments, genetically related dyads are more likely to group. However, the coe¢ cient on this variable uninteracted is insigni…cant in columns 2 and 3, indicating that genetic relatedness is not signi…cantly associated with grouping under treatment 1, i.e., when only group formation costs are important. The linear restriction tests in columns 2 and 3 indicate that genetic relatedness has a signi…cant e¤ect on group formation under treatment 3, where its cost-lowering capacity is combined with its capacity to support enforcement based on social sanctions, even though neither of these capacities is su¢ cient to generate a signi…cant e¤ect on its own.
Once the village dummies are introduced, there is evidence that co-memberships in economic
CBOs increases the likelihood of grouping together under treatment 1. This …nding is consistent with Prediction 3 and suggests that prior experience of grouping together voluntarily leads to lower group formation costs.
Prediction 4: Only one of the interaction terms involving the treatment 2 dummy is signi…cant and, even then, in only one of the models. Prior to the introduction of village dummies, i.e., in column 2, co-memberships in economic CBOs are associated with an increased likelihood of grouping together under treatment 2 both in absolute terms and as compared to treatment 1. This …ndings is consistent with Prediction 4. However, this e¤ect is not observed in column 3. The introduction of village dummies alters the apparent nature of the e¤ect of CBO co-memberships on group formation from being trust-based to cost-based. We will return to this issue below.
Prediction 5: The coe¢ cients on the interaction terms between the treatment 3 dummy and co-religion and the treatment 3 dummy and marriage ties are positive, signi…cant and robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the village dummy variables. These …ndings are consistent with Prediction 5 and indicate that co-religion and marriage ties support enforcement based on social sanctioning.
Prediction 6: The coe¢ cient on the interaction term between the treatment 3 dummy and co-memberships in economic CBOs is negative, signi…cant and robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the village dummy variables, although it is smaller in absolute magnitude when the village dummies are included. This is consistent with Prediction 6. The signi…cance of the overall e¤ect of co-memberships in economic CBOs on grouping under treatment 3 varies between columns 2 and 3. The model in column 2 indicates that the desire to protect these valuable ongoing relationships from the possible e¤ects of a public defection signi…cantly outweighs their e¤ect on the cost of group formation and trust, whereas the model in column 3 indicates that the desire to protect these relationships simply cancels out their e¤ect on the cost of group formation and trust.
Summary and discussion
The aim of this paper was to investigate the extent to which available enforcement mechanisms a¤ect who shares risk with whom. Our approach was to apply dyadic regression analysis to data from a speci…cally designed behavioral experiment, two surveys, and a genealogical mapping exercise. The experimental element in the research design was critical as it excluded any causal in ‡uence running from who was sharing risk with whom to the enforcement mechanism adopted. Three treatments were applied during the experiment, each corresponding to a different enforcement mechanism: perfect enforcement by an outside party; enforcement through intrinsic incentives such as altruism and mutual trust; and enforcement through extrinsic incentives arising from the fear of social punishment possibly in the form of exclusion from future interactions.
Combining insights from the rich and diverse theoretical literature on risk sharing with ethnographic information pertaining to the context in which we conducted the experiment we derived six predictions concerning who would share risk with whom during the experiment and how this would vary across the three enforcement mechanisms.
Five out of the six predictions received at least some support from the data: in accordance and in accordance with Prediction 6, those with co-memberships in CBOs serving an economic purpose withdrew from grouping under treatment 3, i.e., when social punishments could be used to enforce grouping to share risk.
The analysis depended on the estimation of a reduced form model of group formation. However, the …ndings are consistent with group formation being easier or less costly between individuals of the same sex and, possibly between kin and those who share more co-memberships in CBOs serving an economic purpose. Co-memberships in CBOs serving an economic purpose may also provide a basis for mutual trust. However, here, in particular, the perturbing of the result when village dummies are added to the model needs some consideration. The density of each the four types of social ties included in our models varies signi…cantly across villages, with the variation being most signi…cant in the case of co-memberships in economic CBOs. This is undoubtedly leading to problems of identi…cation and indicates that future studies should involve a larger number of villages or reduce the number of treatments applied or aim to match the village samples across treatments rather than assigning treatments randomly.
Our …ndings concerning which type of social ties support informal enforcement based on social sanctioning and which are protected from the consequences of social sanctions having to be applied are considerably more robust. Co-religion provides a foundation for enforcement based on social sanctioning, possibly because of religious traditions about transgressions, admissions, contrition and forgiveness. Marriage ties between in-laws also provide a basis for enforcement through social sanctioning, although, here, contrition and forgiveness would seem less likely to be involved.
Finally, pairs of participants who, through their co-memberships in CBOs serving an economic purpose, are likely to be engaged in highly valued but vulnerable repeated exchanges are more likely to group when a third party is enforcing the contract but withdraw from group formation when there is a risk of public defections. This is important because it provides support for Barr and Genicot's (2008) (T2 x R) + R (T2 x C) + C (T2 x G) + G (T2 x M) + M (T3 x R) + R (T3 x C) + C (T3 x G) + G (T3 x M) + M Observations 10470 10470 10470 ** * Notes: All standard errors adjusted to account for dyadic non-independence; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
